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ABSTRACT. The aim of this paper is to account for the impact of statistical noise and exogenous regulatory and en-
vironmental factors on the efficiency of public transit systems in a DEA-based framework. To this end, we im-
plement a three-stage DEA-SFA mixed approach based on Fried et al. (2002) using a 1993-1999 panel of 42 Ital-
ian public transit companies. This allows us to decompose input-specific DEA inefficiency measures into three 
components: exogenous effects, pure managerial inefficiency, and statistical noise. First, the initial evaluation of 
producer performance is carried out using conventional variable returns to scale DEA (Banker et al., 1984). Sec-
ond, a SFA approach (Battese and Coelli, 1992) is used to regress single input slacks on subsidies regulation 
(cost-plus versus fixed-price contracts) and a set of environmental variables including network speed and user 
density. Finally, third stage re-runs DEA on inputs purged of both exogenous effects and statistical noise. Results 
are such that adjusting for the type of regulatory scheme, environmental conditions, and statistical noise increases 
average efficiency in the industry and reduces dispersion among firms. Furthermore, the implementation of fixed-
price subsidies is found to enhance efficiency in the usage of “drivers” and “materials and services” inputs. Such 
a result sheds some light on the determinants of input-specific efficiency differentials in the industry, improving 
the existing evidence on mean overall cost efficiency (e.g. Gagnepain e Ivaldi, 2002; Piacenza, 2006). As a policy 
implication, it is confirmed the relevance of regula tion aimed at replacing cost-plus subsidization mechanisms 
with high-powered incentive contracts as well as improving operating conditions of public transport networks. 
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INTRODUCTION 
his paper reconciles empirical contract 
theory applied to local public transport 
(LPT) industry with Data Envelopment 
Analysis (DEA)-based models incorporating 
policy and environmental effects and statistical 
noise. The main policy implication of our study 
is related to the assessment of the efficiency en-
hancing effect of “fixed-price” regulatory 
schemes as compared to “cost-plus” ones. 
Building upon previous literature on the topic 
dealing with the Italian case (Piacenza, 2006), 
the work is aimed at verifying the extent to 
which both regulation and other non-
discretionary factors affect input-by-input inef-
ficiency differentials in the industry. Further-
more, we pursue the analysis allowing for the 
presence of statistical noise, overcoming the 
limitation of DEA models due to their determi-
nistic nature. Such an aim is motivated by the 
fact that inputs employed by local public trans-
port suppliers can be rationalized at different ex-
tent. Hence, it is predictable that changes in 
regulation and/or environmental characteristics 
may induce higher slack reductions in the usage 
of more controllable inputs (e.g. labor) as com-
pared to less controllable ones (e.g. fuel).  
A crucial issue in the literature investigating 
the determinants of the production (or X-) inef-
ficiency in LPT systems is the role played by 
non-discretionary characteristics in affecting lo-
cal suppliers’ performance. Due to the high de-
gree of regulation, alternative subsidization 
mechanisms are indeed most likely to give rise, 
ceteris paribus, to inefficiency differentials 
across suppliers. Furthermore, it might well be 
the case of efficiency gaps induced by different 
network conditions (e.g. average commercial 
speed) that are not under the control of local op-
erators. Hence, the design of producer perform-
ance evaluation procedures able to encompass 
external sources of inefficiency should be re-
garded as a major concern in efficiency analysis 
for the industry. In the light of this, we adopt a 
recently developed methodology within the line 
of research of DEA-based models (Fried et al., 
2002) incorporating exogenous (i.e. regulatory 
and environmental) effects and statistical noise. 
Previous literature has dealt with the role 
played by different subsidization mechanisms in 
explaining inefficiency differentials among LPT 
operators, reaching the uncontroversial conclu-
sion that the predictions from incentive theory 
(Laffont and Tirole, 1993) help explain differ-
ences in productive efficiency among firms. 
This stream of research includes the contribu-
tions by Kerstens (1996) and Gagnepain and 
Ivaldi (2002a, b) for the French urban transit in-
dustry, and by Dalen and Gomez-Lobo (1997, 
2003) for Norway. More recently, Piacenza 
(2006) has investigated the LPT Italian case, 
controlling for the environmental characteris-
tics of each network. His analysis is based on 
a panel data of firms managed under two regula-
tory schemes (i.e. cost-plus or fixed-price) and 
facing different levels of network commercial 
speed. The main conclusion is that – given simi-
lar network characteristics – firms under a fixed-
price mechanism exhibit a lower distortion from 
minimum cost than operators subjected to a 
cost-plus regulation. Furthermore, to some ex-
tent the inefficiency differentials among compa-
nies are found to be due to differences in the 
network characteristics (commercial speed lev-
els). 
This study aims at investigating the impact of 
exogenous factors on the X-efficiency of the 
Italian LPT industry, within a DEA-based 
framework which takes also into account the 
presence of statistical noise. More precisely, we 
intend to provide a decomposition of input-
specific DEA inefficiency measures into three 
components: environmental factors, pure mana-
gerial inefficiency, and random noise. Such a 
methodology proceeds in three steps. First, 
given a deterministic non-parametric reference 
technology for LPT operators consisting of four 
inputs (drivers, indirect employees, fuel, and 
materials and services) and one output (seat-
kilometers) we run the initial performance 
evaluation using DEA. Second, a Stochastic 
Frontier Analysis (SFA) approach is adopted to 
regress stage-one input slacks on a set of regula-
tory and environmental variables. Finally, we re-
run DEA on inputs quantities purged of both ex-
ogenous effects and statistical noise.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as 
follows. Section 1 presents the main features of 
the Italian LPT industry. The focus will be on 
both the institutional context and the regulation 
T 
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of subsidies, in order to clarify the relevance of 
the research issue under investigation. Section 2 
details the employed methodology, mainly refer-
ring to Fried et al. (2002). Section 3 deals with 
the presentation of the frontier model to be esti-
mated, underlying the peculiarities of our em-
pirical implementation. First, we concentrate on 
the specification of the deterministic non-
parametric reference technology of service sup-
pliers. Then, we discuss the relevance of the 
regulatory and environmental characteristics in-
cluded in the estimated SFA regression equa-
tions and introduce the expected sings for the 
coefficients of variables used as proxies for sub-
sidization mechanisms and other non-
discretionary factors. Section 4 gives detail on 
the dataset used in the estimations. Results are 
reported in section 5 and section 6 concludes. 
1. THE ITALIAN FRAMEWORK 
The characteristic of universal service that Local 
Authorities usually attribute to LPT imposes the 
maintenance of low tariff levels. Thus the LPT 
operators have to face structural balance defi-
cits, which need public subsidies to be refilled. 
A typical and critical issue for regulation Au-
thorities is therefore to assure the economic and 
financial brake-even of LPT operators, but at the 
same time to minimize the waste of public 
funds.  
In Italy (as in most of European Countries), 
during the ‘70s and the ‘80s costs of LPT firms 
have risen more than revenues. The first effort 
to face this problem has been implemented in 
the Law 151/1981, which provided for an ex 
ante definition of subsidy levels, yearly allo-
cated to the National Transport Fund (NTF) and 
then assigned to the providers. The amount 
yearly allotted might act as a compensation to 
operators for providing services at a price lower 
than its costs. The remaining deficit should have 
been balanced by selling transport services. De-
spite this rule, both the high inflation rates (not 
taken into account in the centralized allotment) 
and the decrease of demand levels contributed to 
enhance firms’ deficits and compelled the cen-
tral Government to allocate ex-post funds. Not-
withstanding this kind of cost-plus grant acted 
only as stopgap measures, and has been unable 
to readjust industry accounts. 
In practice, before 1996 all LPT Italian pro-
viders received cost-plus reimbursements, char-
acterized by the full recovery of budget losses 
by local authorities.1 In this context, the firm 
bears neither industrial risk (risks on costs) nor 
commercial risk (risks on revenue). According 
with the new theory of regulation (Laffont and 
Tirole, 1993), in this situation the operator is not 
residual claimant for effort and so it has no in-
centives to produce efficiently. During the ‘90s 
radical regulatory changes have been introduced 
to improve both service efficiency and effec-
tiveness. First the law 549/1995 established the 
abolition of the NTF (since 1996) and the allo-
cation of the public funds responsibility to the 
Regions, who are in charge of the LPT pro-
gramming as well. For this reason since 1996 
some local authorities have introduced ex ante 
reimbursement mechanisms (fixed-price 
schemes), which provide different risk-sharing 
schemes between firm and local authority. 
Compared to cost-plus schemes, the companies 
subjected to fixed-price mechanisms face high-
powered incentives towards a cost minimizing 
behavior.2 Then the Legislative Decrees 
422/1997 and 400/1999 provided a guide for 
transport system reform to be implemented by 
each Region. 
The main purpose of the whole transport re-
form is to stimulate the recovery of LPT suppli-
ers’ productive efficiency, first by increasing the 
financial responsibility of all the subjects operat-
ing in the sector (local authorities and LPT 
firms). For this reason the transfers from the 
central government have been replaced with re-
gional taxes, in order to encourage an efficient 
use of public local resources. The reform also 
provides for a clear distinction between pro-
gramming and regulatory functions (assigned to 
                                                                    
1 European Commission (1998). 
2 It is worthwhile to underline that both cost-plus and 
fixed-price schemes are not optimal rules in the sense 
specified by the new theory of regulation. According to this 
approach, because of the presence of informational 
constraints, optimal mechanisms must solve the trade-off 
between the efficiency incentives typical of fixed-price 
schemes and the rent extraction properties of a cost-plus 
regulation. The complex problem of designing an optimal 
contract is beyond the scope of this study, as only fixed-
price or cost-plus subsidization mechanisms are carried out 
at the present time in the Italian LPT industry. 
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public administrators) and the industrial man-
agement (assigned to LPT companies).  
Secondly, the reform tries to introduce some 
competition “for the market” in the sector, by 
requiring competitive tendering procedures to 
allot LPT services. Competitive tendering in the 
assignment of franchised monopolies is the main 
mechanism to create competitive pressure when 
the open competition is not possible or is not 
economic. Therefore, if competition in the mar-
ket is not feasible for technical reasons, the only 
way to enhance efficiency is to introduce com-
petition for the market (Demsetz, 1968; Laffont 
and Tirole, 1993). Foreign experiences of com-
petitive tendering in LPT sector have produced 
some positive effects both on productivity and 
cost savings (Cambini and Filippini, 2003). 
However, the adoption of tendering procedures 
is not so simple, local authorities having to cor-
rectly define the structure of a competitive ten-
dering procedure in order to avoid negative ef-
fects for the whole LPT market and hence for 
customers. 
Moreover the Law states that the relation-
ships between the regulator and the LPT pro-
vider have to be outlined by means of a formal 
agreement: the ‘service contract’. It should 
clearly name the service duties of the LPT com-
pany as well as the regulator/operator risk-
sharing scheme and the ways to determine the 
amount of settlements. Each service contract has 
to have certain financial allotment in the regula-
tor budget and to contain instruments to improve 
firms’ efficiency. Anyway the transfer from the 
local authority has to be ex-ante defined, on the 
basis of expected operating costs (gross cost ap-
proach) or expected operating deficits (net cost 
approach), and the amount of actual costs (or 
deficits) has not to influence the level of subsi-
dies (fixed-price contract). 
One of the goal of the present paper is to in-
vestigate input-by-input whether public transit 
companies running under fixed-price regimes 
are more efficient than those operating under 
cost-plus schemes, due to stronger incentives to 
increase managerial effort, taking also into ac-
count firm-specific network characteristics. On 
the policy side, this investigation allows us to 
assess whether subsidization schemes recently 
introduced in Italy have proved suitable in order 
to recover efficiency, which is one of the goals 
pursued by the legislative reform, also highlight-
ing the management areas where the rationaliza-
tion attempt resulted more effective. In addition, 
we may extend previous evidence on the rele-
vance of incentive theory and modern regulatory 
economics for the production analysis of public 
utilities.  
2. ESTIMATION METHODOLOGY 
Our approach is based on the three-stage meth-
odology proposed by Fried et al. (2002), 
whereby we account for the impact of external 
conditions (regulatory and environmental fac-
tors) and statistical noise in a DEA-based pro-
ducer performance evaluation framework. The 
aim is to identify three input-specific determi-
nants of inefficiency – exogenous factors, pure 
managerial inefficiency and statistical noise – in 
the Italian LPT industry.  
This section reviews Fried et al. (2002) 
methodology. Section 4 details the implementa-
tion of such methodology to our case study, fo-
cusing on the specification of nonparametric de-
terministic reference technology and on the 
modelling of regulatory schemes and other envi-
ronmental variables involved in the analysis.  
Consider I Decision Making Units (DMUs) - 
with i = 1, …, I - each of them employing N in-
puts (n = 1,…, N) to produce M outputs (m = 1, 
…, M). DEA-based measures of the ith producer 
performance – relative to the best-practise non-
parametric frontier – has the limitation of ne-
glecting two possible sources of inefficiency. 
First, DEA models are solely based on inputs 
and outputs data. However, the external condi-
tions under which the ith production is carried 
out can be relatively favorable/unfavorable – as 
compared to other firms in the comparison set – 
due to the positive/negative impact of any ob-
servable exogenous characteristics. Second, any 
other unobservable factors and omitted variables 
are also ruled out from the performance evalua-
tion, the DEA framework being deterministic. 
Hence, accounting for neither of these non-
discretionary differentials across firms belong-
ing to the comparison set might lead to 
over/under-evaluated performances and mis-
leading rankings.  
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A solution to such limitation is given by the 
adoption of SFA in order to decompose DEA 
input slacks into exogenous effects, managerial 
inefficiency and statistical noise (Fried et al., 
2002). We apply this approach to the Italian 
public transit systems.3 Using data on observed 
inputs and outputs, a standard input-oriented 
variable returns to scale envelopment problem is 
solved for each ith firm in the sample (Banker et 
al., 1984):  
 
λθ ,min    θ    [1] 
subject to λθ Xxi ≥   
   iyY ≥λ    
   0≥λ     
   1=λTe    
 
where xi is the ith DMU (N x 1) non-negative 
vector of inputs; yi is the ith DMU (M x 1) non-
negative vector of outputs; λ = [λ1, …, λI] is an 
(I x 1) vector of intensity variables; X = [x1, …, 
xI] is an (N x I) matrix of input vectors in the 
comparison set; Y = [y1, …, yI] is an (M x I) ma-
trix of output vectors in the comparison set; e = 
[1, …, 1] is a (I x 1) unit vector. The solution of 
the above linear programming problem in terms 
of non-negative and bounded to one optimal 
value θ  allows to evaluate total slacks (radial 
plus non radial) for each input as the non-
negative scalars: 
 
λnnini Xxs −= ;  n = 1,..., N and  i = 1, ..., I.    [2] 
 
Stage two involves the estimation of N sto-
chastic frontier equations. In each of them the 
dependent variable is the nth total input slack and 
the independent variables are the z non-
discretionary regulatory and environmental vari-
ables. The aim is to purge slacks of external ef-
fects and statistical noise not accounted for in 
stage one, letting each of the exogenous charac-
teristics producing a different impact across the 
SFA equations.4 The N separate SFA regressions 
                                                                    
3 For a discussion on previous approaches attempting to 
incorporate environmental variables in DEA-like model, see 
Fried et al. (2002). 
4 The alternative strategy would be to estimate (M + N) 
regressions. For a discussion of advantages and 
disadvantages of both estimation strategies see Fried et al. 
(2002). 
take the following form: 
 ( ) ninininni uzfs ++= υβ,        [3] 
 
where zi = [z1i, …, zKi] is a vector of K exoge-
nous variables and βn are unknown parameters 
to be estimated and (υni + uni) is a composite er-
ror term. The component υni ~ (0, σ2υn) repre-
sents statistical noise, while the one-sided trun-
cated-normal error term uni ~ N+(µn, σ2un) re-
flects pure managerial inefficiency, with mean 
µn and variability σ2un across observed slacks of 
the nth input. For the alternative assumption of 
half-normal distributed managerial inefficiency, 
we have instead uni ~ N+(0, σ2un). 
The deterministic feasible slack frontier term 
fn(zi, βn) captures the impact of observable ex-
ternal factors (regulation and environmental 
characteristics) on the stage-one slacks. Once 
statistical noise is accounted for, the stochastic 
feasible slack frontiers is given by the expres-
sion fn(zi, βn) + υni, which indicates the mini-
mum achievable slack in a noisy context. Under 
the alternative distributional assumptions on the 
inefficiency error term – truncated and half- 
normal distributions – the parameters to be es-
timated using a maximum likelihood (ML) tech-
nique are given by (βn, nµ , σ2υn, σ2un) and (βn, 
σ2υn, σ2un) respectively. Given the obtained esti-
mates for βn and υni, adjusted input quantities 
( Anix ) are then evaluated: 
 


 −

+


 −




+= ∧∧
∧∧
ninii
n
i
n
iini
A
ni zzxx υυββ maxmax        [4] 
 
where the first term in square brackets force all 
firms to operate in the least favourable environ-
ment observed in the sample, while the second 
term in square brackets forces all firms to oper-
ate in the unluckiest situation observed in the 
sample. By doing so, distortions from the effi-
cient usage of each input due to external factors 
and random noise, which are not under the con-
trol of LPT firms, are removed.  
The final step of the analysis consists of re-
runing the DEA-based producer performance 
evaluation using data on adjusted inputs in order 
to reflect differences in firms’ exogenous condi-
tions. The comparison between initial and final 
DEA efficiency measures gives the understand-
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ing of the extent to which non-discretionary 
variables affect efficiency differentials, other 
things being equal. 
3. MODEL SPECIFICATION 
3.1 Technology 
In line with the mainstream of DEA and SFA 
literature, we adopt an input-oriented framework 
in the first DEA stage. This choice relies on the 
fact that firms are well-expected to minimise the 
use of inputs given the amount of output they 
provide.  
A fundamental stage in any DEA assessment 
is the specification of a set of variables that cor-
rectly capture the underlying technology (Tha-
nassoulis, 2001). The identification of a bundle 
of inputs used in the procurement of a bundle of 
corresponding outputs is thus needed. Environ-
mental factors that might affect the efficiency of 
transformation of inputs into outputs are not 
considered at this phase, because they will be 
taken into account in the second SFA-based 
stage. With regards to the output measure, in 
principle one might try to estimate the efficiency 
conditions either in a demand or a supply-
related framework. De Borger et al. (2002) point 
out that supply-related output indicators might 
be considered to a larger extent under the con-
trol of the management than the demand of tran-
sit service by passengers. It should be recog-
nised that the decisions on the service level pro-
vision are not totally under the control of the 
firm because of the presence of regulatory con-
straints on the supply. However, it is reasonable 
to think that such constraints are the outcome of 
some negotiation process with the regulatory au-
thorities. Thus, following Piacenza (2006) a 
supply-oriented framework is adopted in this 
study and a measure that captures the production 
capacity of the firms is needed.  
Two alternative conventional output meas-
ures usually adopted in the public transit litera-
ture are the yearly vehicle-kilometres and the 
yearly seat-kilometres. The first one is calcu-
lated as the total number of vehicles in the fleet 
times the average distance yearly covered by 
each vehicle. The second one is calculated as the 
total number of vehicles in the fleet times the 
average size of the vehicles in terms of seats 
times the average distance yearly covered by 
each vehicle. The second output indicator seems 
to provide better information on the amount of 
the service as it takes into account the differen-
tiation in size among firms’ vehicles. Thus, we 
chose the latter (SKM) as our preferable output 
measure. 
The conventional inputs used in the DEA 
frontier analyses are labour, fuel and other mate-
rials and services.5 Labour has been included by 
splitting the number of workers in two catego-
ries: drivers (emplDR) and indirect employees 
(emplIND). The reason of this decomposition 
stands on the predominance of the cost of driv-
ers as percentage of total labour cost. Thus, it 
might be interesting to investigate the conditions 
of use of this category of workers in isolation 
from non-drivers.6 Fuel (FUEL) is measured as 
the total amount of yearly consumed litres of 
gasoline (or equivalent kilowatt-hours of en-
ergy). Other materials and services is a not ho-
mogeneous item. A physical measure is not 
available for this input, hence we chose to use 
the corresponding cost (CMS), opportunely de-
flated7 so as to avoid any problem regarding 
changes in prices. The cost of materials and ser-
vices has been derived by the balance-sheets of 
the firms as difference between the total operat-
ing expenditure and the costs of labour and fuel. 
It includes various types of costs within which 
the highest percentage belongs to the costs for 
maintenance and outsourced services. Table 1 
reports descriptive statistics on output and inputs 
involved into the analysis. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                    
5 See De Borger et al. (2002) for a comprehensive review 
of the inputs most widely considered in the transit industry 
6 Although we will present the results on both the inputs, 
we will focus on drivers as they are the main source of costs 
for the firms. 
7 The deflator is the production price index. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics for output and input variables 
Type of LPT system SKM (106) a emplDR b emplIND b FUEL(103 litres) c CMS(106 €) d 
Urban       
Mean 1,166 532 274 5,565 14,242 
Standard Deviation 1,507 602 392 7,446 20,425 
      
Minimum 48 23 4 233 435 
1st quartile 246 133 42 1,269 3,943 
Median 883 344 110 3,865 9,557 
3rd quartile 1,199 595 307 6,299 14,164 
Maximum 6,554 2,758 1,698 33,143 102,436 
      
Variability index* 129% 113% 143% 134% 143% 
Mixed      
Mean 1,062 507 212 4,999 16,254 
Standard Deviation 973 535 310 4,397 18,939 
      
Minimum 59 30 4 352 1,184 
1st quartile 427 173 54 2,168 4,885 
Median 891 369 97 4,120 9,704 
3rd quartile 1,102 464 174 5,335 15,822 
Maximum 3,909 2,290 1,323 18,103 86,427 
      
Variability index 92% 106% 146% 88% 117% 
Intercity      
Mean 820 335 163 4,035 9,285 
Standard Deviation 578 288 258 2,667 6,064 
      
Minimum 148 78 26 1,037 1,924 
1st quartile 326 196 60 1,894 4,118 
Median 735 250 79 3,673 7,753 
3rd quartile 1,122 342 151 4,775 11,114 
Maximum 2,043 1,339 1,307 10,500 24,536 
      
Variability index 71% 86% 158% 66% 65% 
* The variability index is computed as the ratio between standard deviation and mean. 
a SKM =  number of yearly seat-kilometers supplied.  
b emplDR and emplIND = number of drivers and indirect employees, respectively.  
c FUEL = litres of gasoline consumed. 
d CMS = real value of yearly expenses for materials and services. 
 
 
Following Fried et al. (2002), capital input 
has not been considered either as stock measure 
or as depreciation in the DEA model. Capital is 
a non-discretionary input, at least in the short-
run, and the imposition of a quasi-fixed input in 
the minimisation DEA algorithm would have 
resulted in a significant shrinking of the set of 
peers so that each unit could have appeared as 
unique and with an efficiency score close to 
unity.8 However, capital has been recovered as a 
control variable in the second SFA stage 
through the inclusion of size dummy variables, 
where size is measured in terms of the number 
of vehicles in the rolling stock. This solution al-
                                                                    
8 See Coelli et al. (1998) and Thanassoulis (2001) for 
more details on the treatment of quasi-fixed inputs. 
lows us to avoid the difficult and inevitably im-
perfect construction of a time series of the re-
placement cost for capital, adjusted for taking 
into account inflation and/or revaluations. As 
during the period under investigation the major-
ity of the firms undertook a reorganisation proc-
ess passing from municipal firms to limited 
companies, the above-mentioned fixed assets 
revaluation could have represented a serious 
problem. 
3.2 Regulation and environmental factors 
As stated above, any efficiency comparison 
should not neglect the external conditions under 
which firms operate. Such characteristics might 
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create advantages or disadvantages for the firms 
so that the efficiency scores might result heavily 
affected. In other words, a high/low efficiency 
score might be attributed to a favourable/not fa-
vourable action of exogenous variables rather 
than to the actual effort/inadequacy of the man-
agers. Hence, the resulting ranking of the firms 
should be viewed as a very preliminary one, re-
quiring an adjustment to embody the impact of 
exogenous variables. These variables cannot be 
included as inputs or outputs, being out of the 
control of the management. 
We consider two exogenous sources of effi-
ciency differentials across LPT suppliers: the 
regulatory policy context and the environmental 
non-discretionary characteristics. In the follow-
ing we provide microeconomic insights on the 
variables included into the analysis in order to 
capture both sources of inefficiency, discussing 
their expected effects on each considered input. 
All firms in the sample experienced a change 
in the regulation during the period under inves-
tigation. The decentralisation of the financial 
responsibility at a regional level has increased 
the power of the regions in selecting service ar-
eas to be subsidised. Furthermore, local public 
authorities gradually abandoned previous cost-
plus schemes based on a full ex-post coverage of 
the losses, adopting risk-sharing fixed-price 
schemes which allow for a rent and at the same 
time are expected to stimulate the firms to a bet-
ter performance through a tighter control on the 
inputs.  
The impact of regulatory schemes has been 
analysed by Kerstens (1996) for France under a 
DEA framework. In particular, the author veri-
fied that the efficiency scores under different 
non-parametric frontier specifications are more 
related to high-powered incentive schemes if 
seat-kilometres are used as output variable. 
Gagnepain and Ivaldi (2002a, b) and Dalen and 
Gomez-Lobo (1997) assessed the impact of 
fixed-price policy on the managerial effort for 
French and Norwegian bus industries using a 
structural cost function model based on a princi-
pal-agent framework. They empirically demon-
strated that the fixed-price policy dominates 
cost-plus schemes and that the underlying yard-
stick mechanism can help the regulator to re-
duce the lack of information on the firm’s cost 
structure. Finally, Dalen and Gomez-Lobo 
(2003) and Piacenza (2006) analysed the effects 
of the adoption of high-powered incentive 
schemes of subsidization respectively for Italy 
and Norway within the SFA framework pro-
posed by Battese and Coelli (1995). Both studies 
shed some light on the effectiveness of risk-
sharing contracts (yardstick and fixed-price type 
of regulation) in enhancing efficiency. So we 
expect that the introduction of fixed-price 
schemes will increase the level of efficiency and 
reduce the slacks in the use of the resources, at 
least for those inputs that are more suitable for 
rationalisation, such as drivers and costs of ma-
terials and services. Regulation (REG) is in-
cluded in our model as a dummy variable that 
assumes, for each firm, value 1 after the intro-
duction of a fixed-price contract and 0 otherwise. 
Non-discretionary characteristics include 
variables linked to network features – namely, 
average commercial speed and population den-
sity – as well as to other environmental factors 
outside the control of the managers, such as av-
erage fleet age, operational size and technologi-
cal change (Dalen and Gomez-Lobo, 2003; 
Piacenza, 2006).  
Average commercial speed (SPEED) is a 
well-recognised relevant network characteristics 
for several reasons and is commonly used as a 
proxy for congestion costs. As average speed 
declines, due to higher congestion or lack of 
preferential lanes, the number of vehicles per 
kilometre is expected to increase together with 
the number of engaged drivers. Furthermore, 
more frequent stop and go or prolonged stops 
due to highly busied routes are likely to enhance 
fuel consumption. Finally, lower network speeds 
imply higher maintenance or repairmen costs 
due to more accidents.9 Summarizing, we postu-
late a positive effect of higher average speed on 
technical efficiency trough a reduction of the 
slacks for drivers, fuel and materials and ser-
vices, whereas the impact on indirect workers is 
ambiguous. 
Population density (DENS) has been calcu-
lated as population per squared kilometre in the 
transport service provided area. Like average 
speed, population density might be interpreted 
as a measure of congestion, and so reducing ef-
                                                                    
9 In fact, if average network speed reduces, the 
probability that an accident occurs is higher, even if perhaps 
the gravity of accidents will be softened. 
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ficiency. On the other hand, this variable could 
affect the way the network is designed, with 
more or less stops along the lanes, and to some 
extent contribute to increase technical effi-
ciency. Hence, following Kerstens (1996), we 
do not pose a priori expectations on the effect of 
density variable on the input slacks. 
Average fleet age (AGE) is a variable that re-
flects average age of the transit vehicles. To the 
extent newer buses are more spacious than older 
ones, one could expect the newer the buses the 
smaller the number of vehicles in the fleet and 
consequently the number of drivers. However, 
this is a merely empirical consideration. Less 
ambiguous effects might be found with regards 
to fuel and costs of materials and services. In-
deed, a higher age could be reasonably associ-
ated with more frequent drawbacks and higher 
maintenance and repairmen costs. On the other 
hand, as suggested in Boame (2004), newer ve-
hicles might result in a reduction of familiarity 
with them, thus both increasing the number of 
accidents and extending holding time in the 
workshop. Furthermore, newer vehicles might 
be thought as more fuel-saving. Generally, we 
expect a reducing impact of average fleet age on 
fuel and other costs slacks. 
A time trend (TR) is included to account for 
any technological change. Although technical 
progress is a usual hypothesis, no a priori could 
be forecast, especially within a input-by-input 
framework. Since the second stage is a SFA-
based one, TR variable is interpreted to capture 
only technological shifts, and not changes in 
managerial performances, which are embodied 
in the one-sided distributed inefficiency compo-
nent specified in the Battese and Coelli (1992) 
SFA approach. 
Operational size is categorized through 
dummy variables (dBUS1, dBUS2, dBUS3 and 
dBUS4). Four groups are considered and catego-
rized on the basis of the quartile values in the 
number of vehicles. The dBUS1 category in-
cludes the smallest firms while the dBUS4 cate-
gory includes the largest ones. The dBUS1 
dummy variable has been dropped so as the pa-
rameters of other categories give us a measure 
of how slack-relative inefficiency changes if 
size moves upward. It could be argued that local 
governments are particularly careful in promot-
ing the use of public transit services in the pres-
ence of higher congestion. This is the case, for 
instance, of large urban networks, where traffic 
congestion can result in highly critical condi-
tions of circulation in peak-load periods, with 
social reflections (e.g. worsening of the quality 
of life due to strong air and acoustic pollution) 
that alert local governments. Therefore, in order 
to meet peak-load problems, more congested 
networks will be likely to receive proportionally 
higher subsidies for sustaining the investments 
in public transit service. The final result could 
be an excess endowment of vehicles with re-
spect to the optimal rolling stock and an overuse 
of the fleet with respect to the potential demand. 
This would consequently bring about an exces-
sive use of inputs for the largest and more con-
gested networks, especially for those inputs that 
are more directly linked with the circulation of 
the vehicles, such as drivers, fuel and material 
and service costs. It is therefore of interest to as-
sess the impact of the investments’ subsidization 
policy, as proxied by fleet size dummy vari-
ables, on the efficient use of the inputs. 
Finally, we introduced in our model dummy 
variables aimed at representing the specialised 
(urban transport, dURB and intercity transport, 
dINTC) or diversified typology of service (both 
urban and intercity transport, dMIX). This latter 
distinction seems to have a strong role in ex-
plaining cost differentials across firms (Fraquelli 
et al., 2004; Piacenza, 2006). Urban and inter-
city companies typically provide the LPT ser-
vice under very different operational conditions, 
especially in terms of congestion of the covered 
area. The dURB dummy variable has been 
dropped so as the parameters allow us to meas-
ure the overuse of inputs with respect to the ur-
ban networks. These dummies could overlap 
with average speed, as both are linked to con-
gestion, but it is likely that average speed can 
not be the unique distinctive feature among ty-
pologies of service. Thus we decided to main-
tain the service-specific dummies in order to 
capture as much as possible the above men-
tioned differences in the operational context. In 
any case, we do not put any a priori on these 
variables.10 
                                                                    
10 It should be noted that Fraquelli et al. (2004) and 
Piacenza (2006) shed some light on higher potential cost 
savings of the mixed firms. These studies, however, use a 
cost function approach and do not allow therefore for an 
input-by-input decomposition. 
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4. DATA DESCRIPTION 
The dataset used in the following analysis con-
sists of a balanced panel of 42 Italian public-
owned LPT companies which have been ob-
served during the period 1993-1999, for a total 
of 294 pooled observations.  
Our sample firms are fairly representative of 
the universe of Italian public transit systems and 
includes 6 small-sized operators (less than 150 
workers), 19 medium-sized (151-550 workers), 
and 17 large-sized (more than 550 workers). As 
for the type of service provided, 15 firms mostly 
operate in the urban context, 10 firms are spe-
cialized in the intercity service, and the remain-
ing 17 have activities in both compartments 
(multi-service or mixed firms). As for geo-
graphical distribution, 23 operators are located 
in the Northern Regions and 19 provide LPT 
service in Central and Southern Italy. Finally, as 
far as the subsidization mechanisms are con-
cerned, around twenty-four percent of observa-
tions (71 cases) relate to fixed-price regulatory 
schemes, while around seventy-six percent (223 
cases) refer to transit systems under cost-plus 
reimbursement rules. 
The information for the construction of the 
database has been gathered from different 
sources. The main economic and production 
data – as supplied seat-kilometres, total number 
of workers, fuel consumption, rolling stock size, 
total operating cost – have been extracted from 
the Yearly Surveys published by ASSTRA, the 
nationwide trade organization which associates 
the public-owned LPT companies. Disaggre-
gated information concerning technical and en-
vironmental characteristics (i.e. different ty-
pologies of workers, fleet age, average commer-
cial speed, population density) and cost catego-
ries (labor, fuel, materials and services) have 
been obtained through questionnaires sent to 
firms’ managers. In order to investigate the im-
pact of regulation on the efficient use of each 
input, we needed information on the subsidiza-
tion practice for the Italian public transit sys-
tems. To this end, we also included a question 
on the reimbursement mechanism (fixed-price 
or cost-plus) adopted by the competent local au-
thority (Region, Province or Town Council). 
5. RESULTS 
The results of the first DEA stage, obtained 
separately by service category, are shown in Ta-
ble 4 below, which accommodates the compari-
son with the DEA-adjusted scores from the third 
stage. These preliminary unadjusted DEA scores 
indicate a mean efficiency level around 93% for 
the urban firms against a mean value of 85-86% 
for the mixed and intercity LPT systems. Fur-
thermore, it is noteworthy the lower variance of 
the efficiency scores for the urban category. 
Overall, this evidence implies that urban transit 
firms are closer to the efficiency frontier than 
their intercity and mixed counterparts and dif-
ferentials among companies in the former case 
are less marked. However, these efficiency 
scores are far to be reliable, as they do not take 
into account exogenous factors that might affect 
firms’ performance. 
Table 2 reports the results from second stage 
SFA input-by-input regressions. Within each 
equation all the firms from different service 
category have been gathered and the estimates 
have been then controlled for the effect type of 
network Exogenous regulatory and environ-
mental factors are included as non-discretionary 
determinants of input slacks, while the manage-
rial inefficiency component uni has been mod-
elled according to the time-variant specification 
proposed by Battese and Coelli (1992). This 
model assumes )]([ Ttninit euu
−−= η , where η  is a 
parameter to be estimated, t is the present year 
and T is the final year of the observed period. In 
obtaining maximum likelihood estimates of 
slack equations (3) the variance of the aggre-
gated error (υni + uni) is parameterized as 
)σσ(σ 2un
2
υn
2
n +=  and 2n2un σσ=γ  (for each 
equation n = 1, …, N). Thus, γ  represents the 
proportion in the total error variance that is at-
tributable to managerial inefficiency component. 
A likelihood ratio (LR) test for this structural 
parameter is also carried out and it provides an 
insight on whether or not pure managerial inef-
ficiency can be neglected from the analysis. In 
our specification we also assume the ineffi-
ciency terms to be i.i.d. distributed as half-
normal random variables.11 
 
                                                                    
11 This assumption is corroborated by the fact that the 
truncated-normal hypothesis is rejected by the LR test. 
Moreover, the results do not change substantially according 
to the chosen assumption. 
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Table 2: SFA parameters estimates of input slack equations  
slack-emplDR slack-emplIND slack-FUEL slack-CMS Variable 
Coefficient t-stat p-value Coefficient t-stat p-value Coefficient t-stat p-value Coefficient t-stat p-value 
SPEED -1.898 -2.46 0.014 -1.839 -3.10 0.002 -21.210 -3.33 0.001 -53.956 -1.39 0.164 
DENS -0.007 -1.14 0.255 0.004 1.08 0.279 -0.020 -0.39 0.697 -0.027 -0.08 0.932 
AGE -1.444 -0.87 0.385 0.419 0.36 0.719 20.949 1.35 0.177 138.475 1.48 0.138 
REG -17.817 -2.09 0.036 0.110 0.02 0.987 -95.203 -1.15 0.252 -776.511 -1.95 0.052 
TR 7.816 3.54 0.000 -2.159 -1.21 0.227 -53.870 -2.19 0.029 223.943 1.56 0.118 
dBUS2 14.460 1.16 0.247 11.786 1.24 0.215 138.483 1.28 0.201 482.460 0.79 0.427 
dBUS3 51.739 3.69 0.000 27.187 2.63 0.008 434.319 3.28 0.001 1,922.477 2.90 0.004 
dBUS4 12.282 0.83 0.405 31.338 2.78 0.005 421.073 2.97 0.003 1,114.470 1.54 0.123 
dINTC 46.039 2.43 0.015 49.606 3.42 0.001 400.607 2.07 0.038 665.922 0.66 0.509 
dMIX 67.757 3.80 0.000 39.486 3.29 0.001 852.339 5.44 0.000 2,243.988 2.85 0.004 
η 0.270 11.18 0.000 -0.048 -1.27 0.203 -0.077 -2.17 0.030 0.154 2.94 0.003 
γ 0.436 4.40 0.000 0.689 9.12 0.000 0.835 17.87 0.000 0.429 3.16 0.000 
LR test γ = 0 249.322  0.000 84.595  0.000 121.198  0.000 89.308  0.000 
Wald χ2 test 52.050  0.000 21.09  0.020 60.02  0.000 24.89  0.006 
observations 294   294   294   294   
log-likelihood -1,618.554   -1,490.153   -2,208.112   -2,712.801   
 
Ceris-Cnr, W.P. N°  13/2006 
 17
The coefficients for SPEED variable appear 
to be highly significant, with the exception of 
CMS input, and show the expected negative 
sign. This implies that an increase in the average 
network speed would reduce the input slacks. 
Such a conclusion, which reconciles with the 
findings obtained by Piacenza (2006), could be 
of particular interest for the regulatory authority. 
In fact, any intervention concerning the local 
mobility aimed at favouring traffic flows (such 
as the introduction of traffic-lights or round-
bounds), as well as improving the programming 
of bus lanes, could have a significant impact on 
congestion costs and, through this way, on effi-
ciency conditions. 
The impact of DENS variable is not statisti-
cally significant and shows alternation in sign. 
So we can conclude that it does not affect the 
performance of LPT firms in our sample. Notice 
that this result does not create particular prob-
lems of interpretation, as we had not imposed 
any a priori on the effect of this exogenous 
variable on input slacks.  
The parameter associated with the AGE vari-
able is generally not significant, but it become to 
some extent marginally significant with regards 
to CMS input. Besides, it shows the expected 
sign. This would imply that the older the rolling 
stock, on average, the higher the excess ex-
penses for maintenance and repairmen. The in-
vestigation of the sign also matches with our as-
sumption about the FUEL input, even though in 
this case the t-statistic might not be considered 
marginally significant. Notice that the AGE co-
efficient for the emplDR input slack does not 
present the positive sign we have supposed; 
however, the t-test strongly reject the hypothesis 
of statistical significance. 
The policy REG variable matches our predic-
tions for emplDR and CMS inputs. The sign of 
the associated parameter is negative, thus indi-
cating a reduction in the slack as a consequence 
of the introduction of highly-powered (fixed-
price) subsidization contracts. The risk-sharing 
underlying mechanism seems to have worked 
successfully, by forcing LPT firms to reduce the 
overuse of drivers and the excess cost for mate-
rial and services. It is worthwhile to remark that 
drivers and material and service expenses can be 
better rationalized than other inputs (indirect 
employees and fuel), so the change in the regu-
latory practice succeeded in promoting ration-
alization where it resulted more plausible. This 
result confirms previous evidence on the effec-
tiveness of incentive subsidies in reducing pro-
duction inefficiency already obtained in Ker-
stens (1996), Gagnepain and Ivaldi (2002a, b), 
Dalen and Gomez-Lobo (1997; 2003) and 
Piacenza (2006). Moreover, it extends the latter 
by investigating the effects of different regula-
tory practices at single input level. 
As expected, the dummies associated with the 
largest size categories (dBUS3 and dBUS4) have 
a positive and generally significant impact on 
the input slacks. This means that if the firm size 
grows up, the efficiency conditions worsen. As 
already stated, this result might be associated 
with the subsidization practice of the most con-
gested networks. Our interpretation is that the 
conspicuous subsides to investments addressed 
to these LPT systems in order to meet local gov-
ernments’ social goals have actually brought 
about an overcapitalisation problem. This excess 
endowment of rolling stock has induced firms to 
provide service beyond the actual request of the 
users with detrimental effects on efficiency. 
However, reconciling the efficiency reasons 
with social goals is not a simple exercise, and, to 
a certain extent, some degree of production inef-
ficiency might be accepted if a good compro-
mise can be found to make the service more ef-
fective. 
The coefficients for the types of service 
(dINTC and dMIX) are in general highly signifi-
cant and exhibits positive signs, implying that 
intercity and diversified LPT companies are in-
trinsically affected by a higher inefficiency than 
firms operating in urban contexts. This is diffi-
cult to interpret, as the urban networks are usu-
ally characterised by a higher degree of traffic 
congestion and so they are expected to be less 
efficient. However, it is possible that other envi-
ronmental factors beyond congestion act and 
they are able to impact on efficiency conditions. 
In any case, our results contrast with the evi-
dence put forward by Fraquelli et al. (2004) and 
Piacenza (2006) of arising economies of scope 
for diversified public transit systems. 
After having controlled for the effects of 
regulation and environmental characteristics, it 
is worthy to analyse more in details the input-
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by-input managerial inefficiency component 
(uni). The second stage SFA regressions provide 
more reliable measures of the pure managerial 
efficiency by purging DEA slacks of the impact 
of exogenous effects. Furthermore, the adopted 
SFA methodology is able to account for the ef-
fects of statistical noise that can be purged from 
original DEA scores as well. The observation of 
the γ parameter suggests that the impact of pure 
managerial inefficiency appears substantially 
limited, at least for drivers and material and ser-
vice costs, for which only about 43% of the ag-
gregate error term variability is due to ineffi-
ciency. This evidence outlines the non negligi-
ble role played by statistical noise as determi-
nant of the input slacks. In addition, the LR test 
rejected the null hypothesis that γ equals to zero, 
leading to the conclusion that even if regulatory 
and environmental factors other than noise exert 
a strong impact, they are unable to completely 
explain the whole variability observed in the es-
timated input slacks. A significant component, 
particularly relevant, for indirect employees and 
fuel whose values of γ are remarkably higher 
(0.689 and 0.835 respectively) still remains at-
tributable to discrepancies among managerial 
performances. 
As for the parameter η, it is significantly dif-
ferent from zero except for emplIND, and its 
sign is positive for emplDR (0.270) and CMS 
(0.154). The latter result means that inefficiency 
term is decreasing over time. The yearly de-
crease in inefficiency would then be equal to 
around 23.6% in the first case and 14.3% in the 
second case. This reduction could seem a quite 
strong result. The interpretation could be 
searched in the gradual transformation of the or-
ganisational status the public transit systems 
were subjected to during the years under inves-
tigation. In fact, all the units changed their gov-
ernance model from municipal firms to limited 
companies. This decision imposed by the legis-
lator was not unexpected by the managers and 
the change drew a significant increase of the 
autonomy in the firms’ conduct. The above 
mentioned process did not take place suddenly 
and at the same time for all the companies. On 
the contrary, the process has been gradual and 
involved many steps with a straight negotiation 
between Local Authorities and LPT operators. 
Nevertheless, this process could have changed 
the firms’ flair and increased the liability of the 
managers, which in turn stimulated the endeav-
our to come up to an inefficiency reduction path, 
by a rationalization mainly of drivers and mate-
rial and service costs. It is worthwhile to under-
line that this trend of production efficiency dur-
ing the observed years is distinguished from 
technological change, which is captured by the 
time variable TR in the slack function specifica-
tion.12 Notice, in particular, that production effi-
ciency for drivers and materials and services 
showed a progressive improvement during time, 
while technological change seems to have been 
subjected to a regress. In fact, the sign of pa-
rameter associated to TR is positive, even 
though for CMS the parameter is only margin-
ally significant. 
Once accounted for the impact of regulatory 
and environmental factors, the third stage has 
been carried out using the algorithm (4) for ad-
justing the inputs data. Table 3 shows, for each 
input categorised by typology of service, the dis-
tribution of the observations between favourable 
and unfavourable external conditions and statis-
tical noise (lucky versus unlucky conditions). 
The discriminatory average values have been 
calculated as the fitted values of the exogenous 
impact and the noise. The high coefficients of 
variation for external factors and variances for 
noise reveal that a non negligible part of the ob-
servation benefited from a highly favourable ex-
ogenous context and good luck as well as has 
been disadvantaged by exogenous conditions 
and bad luck. Therefore a correction for taking 
into account these effects is needed.  
Finally, following Fried et al. (2002), the ad-
vantaged firms have been aligned with the most 
disadvantaged ones. In other words the input 
data for the more advantaged firms have been 
increased to the extent their advantage could be 
completely absorbed, thus putting all the firms 
in the same condition. In such a manner the 
problematic presence of negative inputs could 
be avoided. Re-running DEA separately for each 
category of service gives rise to new adjusted 
efficiency coefficients no longer  affected by 
exogenous non controllable factors and random 
noise. The comparison between original and ad-
                                                                    
12 In a more general context we estimated also a SFA 
model with temporal dummies instead of a time trend. The 
result remained unchanged. 
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justed DEA scores is showed in Table 4. As ex-
pected, the mean efficiency arises for all types 
of service, and especially for intercity and diver-
sified firms that were more affected by intrinsic 
inefficiency. Moreover, the dispersion around 
the average appears reduced as consequence of 
the exclusion of part of the heterogeneity among 
operators. By aligning the firms on the less fa-
vourable conditions, a large part of the observa-
tions were put in a better light as demonstrated 
by the higher number of upward movements of 
the scores with respect to downward move-
ments. 
Anyway, it should be noted that if we observe 
the minimum adjusted DEA efficiency scores 
large bags of inefficiency remain reaching the 
extreme values (13.8%) for intercity networks. 
 
Table 3: Impact of regulatory and environmental factors and statistical noise on input slacks 
 
Favourable 
external 
conditions 
Non 
favourable 
external 
conditions 
Lucky  
situation 
Unlucky  
situation 
 
Input 
# under 
mean 
# over 
mean 
Coefficient   
of variation
# under 
mean 
# over 
mean 
Sigma 
Intercity networks emplDR 34 33 3.330 34 33 34.74 
 emplIND 30 37 1.889 42 25 45.65 
 FUEL 36 31 8.090 32 35 192.62 
 CMS 36 31 2.762 32 35 903.12 
Mixed networks emplDR 63 59 0.582 64 58 62.47 
 emplIND 55 67 1.710 61 61 31.72 
 FUEL 56 66 0.483 61 61 504.88 
 CMS 56 66 0.560 76 46 2725.99 
Urban networks emplDR 56 49 2.686 55 50 24.70 
 emplIND 51 54 1.271 48 57 21.79 
 FUEL 55 50 1.425 53 52 195.47 
 CMS 57 48 1.617 54 51 1590.78 
 
Table 4: Original (orig) and adjusted (adj) DEA efficiency scores 
 Urban networks Mixed networks Intercity networks 
 DEA-adj DEA-orig DEA-adj DEA-orig DEA-adj DEA-orig 
Mean efficiency 98.75 93.11 99.09 85.45 97.90 86.46 
Minimum 91.95 73.01 93.24 64.72 86.20 48.20 
1st quartile 98.07 87.97 98.87 77.99 97.03 77.33 
2nd quartile 99.48 95.33 99.79 83.32 99.66 93.27 
3rd quartile 100.00 100.00 100.00 97.51 100.00 100.00 
Variance 1.74 7.13 1.41 10.33 3.60 15.75 
# efficient units 40 30 49 22 30 19 
# downward shifts 8  7  2  
# movements from the frontier 6  7  2  
# upward shifts 73  100  48  
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CONCLUSIONS 
The main methodological issue this paper has 
investigated concerns the scope for avoiding 
some drawbacks typical of DEA assessment of 
production inefficiency in public transit systems 
and, more generally, in regulated network utili-
ties. Because of the presence of different exoge-
nous factors and random noise, which are not 
accounted for in standard deterministic DEA 
methodology, the latter may lead to imprecise 
and unreliable estimates of firms’ inefficiency: 
some production units could benefit from a par-
ticularly favourable (unfavourable) external con-
text, such as for instance high-powered (low-
powered) incentive regulation or high (low) 
network speed, as well as from a lucky 
(unlucky) situation linked to unpredictable and 
often unobservable events. This firm-specific 
heterogeneity would therefore be mixed with 
good (bad) performances due to managerial 
skills, thus resulting in an excessively high (low) 
efficiency scores. 
The approach we have adopted to overcome 
the above shortcomings is based on the three-
stage methodology proposed by Fried et al. 
(2002). The latter allowed us to control for the 
impact of regulatory policy, environmental 
characteristics and statistical noise within a 
mixed DEA-SFA framework for firms’ per-
formance evaluation. In particular, stage two in-
volved the estimation of stochastic frontier 
equations separately for each production factor, 
having the corresponding DEA input slacks cal-
culated at stage one as dependent variable and 
non-discretionary regulatory and environmental 
factors as explicative variables. The aim was to 
purge slacks of external effects and statistical 
noise not accounted for in stage one, by letting 
the exogenous characteristics generating a dif-
ferent impact on each input excess. This feature 
of the empirical strategy represents a second 
important methodological aspect addressed in 
the study. In fact, the results from stage two, be-
sides  to permit the re-running of DEA using ad-
justed input quantities (third stage), provide also 
novel evidence on the impact of the three types 
of determinants of input-specific resource 
wastes: regulation and environmental character-
istics, the so-called pure managerial ineffi-
ciency, and statistical noise. 
The issues analyzed have also proved fruitful 
from the perspective of empirical regulatory 
economics and the policy implications the latter 
provides. To date a limited number of studies 
have analyzed how LPT systems actually re-
spond to changes in regulatory incentives. Pre-
vious literature on this subject include the con-
tributions by Dalen and Gomez-Lobo (1997; 
2003), Gagnepain and Ivaldi (2002a, b), Ker-
stens (1996) and Piacenza (2006). Although all 
these studies concluded that incentive theory 
and modern regulatory economics are necessary 
components for the production analysis of LPT 
systems, none of them has tried to disentangle 
the role played by regulation and other firm-
specific exogenous factors (e.g. network charac-
teristics) from the one attributable to pure man-
agement skills in causing the arising of global 
production efficiency. Furthermore, Gagnepain 
and Ivaldi (2002a, b) and Dalen and Gomez-
Lobo (1997) identified a priori a lack of produc-
tivity in labor factor (in particular in driver cate-
gory) as the main source of inefficiency, due to 
the strong incidence of this input on total operat-
ing costs (70% on average in our sample) and to 
the presence of significant informational asym-
metries between LPT operator and regulator as 
for the actual input needs in the production 
process. However, no attempt has been made by 
this group of studies to provide explicit evidence 
on the determinants of efficiency differentials 
among firms at single input level, in spite of the 
importance of this aspect to assess whether cur-
rent regulatory policy is properly addressed to-
wards a more rational and thrifty management 
of resources.  
Our principal finding is that, after controlling 
for the subsidization scheme, environmental 
characteristics, and statistical noise, average 
production efficiency in the LPT industry in-
creases and the dispersion among operators sig-
nificantly reduces. From this result one can de-
duce that the main source for inefficiency has to 
be searched for in non-discretionary exogenous 
factors and random events under which LPT 
companies operate, while pure managerial skills 
only play a minor role. Secondly, the implemen-
tation of high-powered incentive contracts 
(fixed-price subsidies) as well as the presence of 
favourable network conditions (high commercial 
speed) reveal a marked ability of enhancing 
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production efficiency already highlighted by 
previous empirical literature. As for Italy, this 
evidence confirms the policy indications by 
Piacenza (2006), which point out a scope for 
public transport policy to increase efficiency by 
acting on both subsidies and local traffic regula-
tion. Finally, the reducing impact on input 
wastes exerted by incentive mechanisms is 
found to be particularly evident in the usage of 
“drivers” and “materials and services”. Such a 
result sheds some light on the determinants of 
input-specific efficiency differentials in the in-
dustry, thus extending the existing evidence on 
mean overall inefficiency. Moreover, from a 
policy point of view, it provides useful insights 
on the effectiveness of the ongoing Italian regu-
latory reform, which seems to have well worked 
on the management of those production factors 
that are more sensitive to rationalisation. 
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